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5 min Blue Team & SOC en

Active Directory: the first ten changes on a new domain

The short checklist I run on any inherited Active Directory domain: ten cheap, native fixes for privileges, Kerberos, LAPS, SMBv1, auditing and recovery.

Written by Eduardo Olivares, SOC analyst in Barcelona.

  • active-directory
  • hardening
  • windows-server
  • sysadmin

When I inherit an Active Directory domain I didn't build, there's a short list I check before anything else, long before I touch complex GPOs. These are the most common mistakes, the cheapest to fix, and the ones that do the most damage when someone exploits them.

Short answer: the ten changes are about three things. Who holds privileges (Domain Admins, service accounts, passwords that never expire). Which inherited settings to close (unconstrained delegation, default password policy, LAPS, SMBv1). And whether you can see and recover the domain (advanced auditing, nested groups, a tested AD backup). None of them needs a budget.

Accounts and privileges

  1. Privileged accounts with passwords that never expire. Surprisingly common, even for domain admins. One minute to check:
    Get-ADUser -Filter 'PasswordNeverExpires -eq $true -and Enabled -eq $true' -Properties PasswordNeverExpires | Select-Object SamAccountName
    Service accounts almost always show up in that list. Privileged human accounts shouldn't.
  2. Too many people in Domain Admins. The group should be as small as possible, and none of those accounts should be used for day-to-day work. To see who is in it, including members of nested groups:
    Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Recursive | Select-Object SamAccountName
  3. Service accounts with more privileges than they need. They get created "temporarily" with domain admin rights to install something, and they stay that way. Ask which service uses the account and what it really needs. It's almost never Domain Admin.

Settings that get inherited badly

  1. Unconstrained Kerberos delegation. One of the most exploited privilege escalation paths in real AD environments. Any computer or account with it can impersonate whoever authenticates against it. To list them:
    Get-ADComputer -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true' -Properties TrustedForDelegation | Select-Object Name
    Get-ADUser -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true' | Select-Object SamAccountName
    Domain controllers show up in the first list and that's expected. Anything else should move to constrained delegation.
  2. Default password policy. The Default Domain Policy requires only 7 characters. Check it with Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy. Raise it to 14 characters or more, and don't force periodic changes without a reason.
  3. LAPS not deployed. If the local administrator shares one password across every machine, a single compromised machine gives lateral access to all the others. LAPS generates a different password per machine and stores it in AD. Windows LAPS has been built into Windows since the April 2023 updates, it's free, and you prepare the schema with Update-LapsADSchema. After that you have to grant permissions on the organizational unit: Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission so each machine can store its password, and Set-LapsADReadPasswordPermission to decide who can read it.
  4. SMBv1 still enabled "just in case". Years after it stopped being defensible, it keeps turning up. Before switching it off, enable auditing to see whether anything really uses it:
    Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Auditing $true
    # Only once the audit log confirms nothing uses it
    Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false

Visibility and recovery

  1. Advanced auditing switched off. Without a log of group changes and failed sign-ins, every investigation starts blind. Check it with auditpol /get /category:*. The events I use most: 4728, 4732 and 4756 (group membership additions), 4625 (failed logon) and 4740 (account lockout).
  2. Undocumented nested groups. Several levels of nesting end up granting access nobody remembers giving. The -Recursive flag above brings them out. Write the result down the first time so you can compare it later.
  3. No recovery plan for AD itself that has been properly tested. If the domain goes down, everything else goes with it. At the very least: a system state backup of one domain controller, the DSRM password stored somewhere you can find it, and a restore tested in an isolated environment. This is the piece that can least afford to fail silently.

None of these ten points needs a budget or third-party tools: it's all native Windows Server configuration. It's exactly the kind of debt that piles up because "it has always worked like this", until it shows up in an audit or, worse, in a real incident.

Frequently asked questions

What should I check first in an inherited Active Directory?

Privileges. Who is in Domain Admins, which service accounts have more permissions than they need, and which privileged accounts have a password set to never expire. That's three read-only PowerShell queries, and together they give a fairly accurate picture of the domain.

Do I need to buy anything to harden Active Directory?

Not for these ten points. Everything is native Windows Server configuration, including LAPS, which has been built into Windows since the April 2023 updates.

Is it safe to disable SMBv1?

In the vast majority of environments, yes. Enable SMBv1 auditing first and wait a few days to see whether an old machine or printer still uses it. If nothing shows up, you can switch it off without surprises.